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The colonial domination over the original inhabitants of the continent 
has been a subject of debate and consternation since the time of first contact. 
After a visit in the early 1800s to the United States, French theorist Alexis de 
Tocqueville famously wrote in Democracy in America that “[t]he expulsion of the 
Indians often takes place at the present day in a regular and, as it were, a legal 
manner,” characterized by what he called, “great evils” that are “irremediable.”1 
Almost one hundred years later, the legal realist scholar Felix Cohen—widely 
recognized as a defining figure in the field of American Indian law—reminded 
us that, “[l]ike the miner’s canary, the Indian marks the shift from fresh air 
to poison gas in our political atmosphere, and our treatment of the Indian…
marks the rise and fall in our democratic faith” (237).2
There remains today deep concern over Indians and Indian nations within 
the United States. The recognition that Indian nations possess “certain rights, 
including rights of self-governance and self-determination,” as Cohen wrote 
in the first edition of the seminal Handbook of Federal Indian Law, has long been 
the cornerstone of this country’s understanding of Indian tribes’ continued 
desire for “measured separatism”3 and self-governance.4 However, that self-
governing authority is currently under siege. While certain demographic 
and social indicators of Native status have improved in the last few decades, 
1. Alexis De Tocqueville, Democracy in America 340, 342 (Phillips Bradley ed., Vintage Books 
1990) (Henry Reeve trans., Francis Bowen rev. 1835).
2. Citing Frank Pommersheim, Braid of Feathers: American Indian Law and Contemporary 
Tribal Life 55–56 (Univ. of California Press 1997) [hereinafter Braid of Feathers]. As 
Pommersheim himself writes, “No discussion of modern Indian law is complete without 
consideration and acknowledgement of the seminal contribution of Felix Cohen.” (234).
3. Charles F. Wilkinson, American Indians, Time, and the Law: Native Societies in a Modern 
Constitutional Democracy 14 (Yale Univ. Press 1987).
4. Felix S. Cohen, Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law ix (LexisNexis 2005).
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these advances have been directly contraverted by what is widely seen as a 
judicial assault on the core, foundational principles that undergird tribal 
governing authority in Indian country. This so-called “judicial termination”5—
the parameters of which have been largely defined by a string of devastating 
Supreme Court opinions—has spawned a niche subset of scholarly works 
highly critical of the Court’s Indian law jurisprudence.6
In one sense, prominent legal scholar Frank Pommersheim’s latest book, 
Broken Landscape: Indians, Indian Tribes, and the Constitution is well-situated in this 
vein of contemporary critique. Breaking from the more aspirational tone 
taken just fifteen years ago in his highly proclaimed, Braid of Feathers: American 
Indian Law and Contemporary Tribal Life,7 Broken Landscape grapples directly with the 
devastating consequences of reduced tribal autonomy. The project is driven by 
the pressing concern, shared by many in the field, that unprincipled exercises 
of federal power—exerted modernly through the courts more so than the other 
branches of government—will ultimately destroy Indian tribal sovereignty.
In Broken Landscape, Pommersheim delivers a beautifully written, detailed 
account of the complicated nature of Indian nations within the federal system 
and provides a roadmap for understanding how tribal sovereignty has been 
situated—directly or indirectly—in the American constitutional framework 
since the nation’s founding. In doing so, Pommersheim recounts the history 
of the American Indian nation as colonized sovereign within the bounds of 
America’s consuming borders. The sweeping project chronicles a history that 
is, for scholars in the field, comfortably familiar, yet Pommersheim sheds 
new light on historical events and policies that shaped the founding of the 
United States, and, accordingly, its relationship with the indigenous nations 
it encompasses.
Broken Landscape proceeds in three parts: “The Early Encounter,” “Individual 
Indians and the Constitution,” and “The Modern Encounter.” “The Early 
Encounter” recounts the well-known history of contact, war, colonialism, and 
treaty making, but with thoughtful analysis as to how the legal and political 
movements of the particular time intersected with the existence of Indian 
nations (1–154). The insightful and provocative middle section, “Individual 
Indians and the Constitution,” focuses uniquely on the status of individual 
Indians and their dynamic relationship to both their tribal nations and the 
United States, tackling delicate questions of citizenship, religious freedom, 
and civil rights (155–210). But it is the book’s final part, “The Modern 
Encounter,” where Pommersheim really breaks new ground (211–312). Here, 
5. Ralph W. Johnson & Berrie Martinis, Chief Justice Rehnquist and the Indian Cases, 16 Pub. 
Land L. Rev. 1, 24 (1995).
6. See, e.g., Robert A. Williams, Jr., Like a Loaded Weapon: The Rehnquist Court, Indian 
Rights, and the Legal History of Racism in America (Univ. of Minnesota Press 2005); David 
E. Wilkins, American Indian Sovereignty and the U.S. Supreme Court: The Masking of 
Justice (Univ. of Texas Press 1997); Frank Pommersheim, Haiku for the Birds (and Other 
Related Stuff) (Rose Hills Books 2002).
7. Pommersheim, Braid of Feathers, supra note 2.
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Broken Landscape traverses standard terrain, particularly in Chapter 8, wherein 
Pommersheim discusses several—now infamous—Supreme Court opinions of 
the modern era. But, despite this almost obligatory critique, Pommersheim 
closes with the book’s heart, an ambitious proposal to amend the United States 
Constitution to concretize the status of Indian tribes in the federal system with 
the hope of, once and for all, “guaranteeing a meaningful and enduring tribal 
sovereignty” (6). Pommersheim cabins the grandiosity of this endeavor in 
caveats and qualifiers, but the book’s ultimately inspiring objective—cloaked 
in an overarching tone of hopefulness—nevertheless shines through.
“The Early Encounter” sets out principally to educate the reader as to the 
colonial mindset that undergirded the colonization process and concretely link 
it up to the relationship between the government and the indigenous nations 
that survived it. Reminiscent of Robert A. Williams, Jr.’s, The American Indian in 
Western Legal Thought: The Discourses of Conquest—upon which Pommersheim heavily 
draws—Part I relies on a rich, historical record to paint a picture of the dynamic 
between colonizer and colonized. This history reveals the Indian as savage, 
heathen, and uncivilized (24–27), as depicted in the colonial imagination. In 
poetic prose fitting of the author,8 Pommersheim demonstrates how colonizers’ 
beliefs about Indian character provided the rationale necessary to dismiss 
their culture, law, and religion, and, ultimately, take their land. The dismissal 
of the Indian as sub-human and incapable of appreciating private property 
rights (14–18) justified subjecting them to the ‘doctrine of discovery,’ which 
established that “whichever European nation got to a portion of the New 
World first had prior claim” to that territory (90) as against other European 
powers and, of course, vis a vis the “natives” (89–97). And with the doctrine 
came the dispossession of the continent.
Part I draws extensively on some of the earliest Supreme Court cases that 
defined the discovery doctrine, as well as more recent works of scholarship 
that provide a detailed, historical account of the taking of Native lands.9 Here 
Pommersheim spends considerable time discussing the “Marshall trilogy” 
(87–124)—Johnson v. M’Intosh,10 Worcester v. Georgia,11 and Cherokee Nation v. Georgia12–
three early cases penned by Chief Justice John Marshall, which are now firmly 
(if controversially) situated in the core Indian law canon. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock13 
(125–151), which upheld Congress’ virtually unbridled plenary authority 
over Indian affairs and denounced as unnecessary judicial scrutiny over the 
government’s unilateral (and duplicitous) abrogation of an Indian treaty, 
gets a chapter all its own. As Pommersheim notes, even though the “sharpest 
8. As his friends know, Frank is a poet as well as a law professor and has published several 
books of poetry.
9. See, e.g., Stuart Banner, How the Indians Lost Their Land (Harvard Univ. Press 2005).
10. Johnson v. M’Intosh, 1 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
11. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
12. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
13. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
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edges” of Lone Wolf  “have been modified” by subsequent Supreme Court cases 
which “essentially did away with the political question doctrine in Indian law 
and replaced it with the rational basis test,” Lone Wolf nevertheless stands as a 
stark reminder of bare assertions of federal power over Indian tribes and its 
consequences (71).
Part I’s historical account foretells Pommersheim’s reasoning in seeking 
a constitutional amendment as the preferred mechanism to protect tribal 
sovereignty. He identifies the resulting problem: “[I]t remains unclear how 
much of the Marshall trilogy is truly constitutional in nature and how much of 
it is essentially a mélange of statutory and common law doctrine” (114). Thus, 
Part I serves dual purposes for Pommersheim. He employs this history not 
only to tell the story of Indian nations at the time of contact and their resulting 
relationship with the United States, but also to begin to make the case for 
why—in his view—a constitutional amendment is necessary to safeguard Indian 
tribal sovereignty.
Part II, Individual Indians and the Constitution, detours somewhat from the 
author’s more cohesive book-end parts. Here Pommersheim largely switches 
focus away from tribal sovereignty and group rights and towards the dynamic 
status of individual Indians as part of the changing polity of the United 
States. Of course, the rights of individual Indians are a central feature of Broken 
Landscape. Nevertheless, the book’s core mission—advancing an argument for 
a constitutional amendment to protect tribes—necessarily stands at least in 
partial contrast to this individual rights discourse. Pommersheim attempts to 
finesse this disjuncture by carefully linking Indians’ individual rights to the 
absence of constitutional protections for Indian nations more broadly. This 
move is largely successful, though could benefit from the inclusion of other 
theoretical works—such as those of Will Kymlicka—which more expressly 
explain how liberal ideals can only be effectuated when exercised through the 
individual’s religious and cultural commitments to and with groups.14
Quite logically, Pommersheim begins this part with a discussion of United 
States citizenship, which was not formally extended to all Indians until 1924 
and even then only via statute (156).15 Pommersheim gives a thoughtful analysis 
of the complicated nature of citizenship for American Indians, explicating 
how they struggle to integrate the “tripartite nature of [their] citizenship” as 
“federal, state, and tribal citizens” (181). He spends considerable time with 
the 1884 case of Elk v. Wilkins,16 in which John Elk, an Indian man, sought to 
renounce his tribal citizenship and become a citizen of the United States. The 
Supreme Court denied him the right to U.S. citizenship, ultimately ruling that 
“[w]ardship was an impediment to citizenship and could be changed only 
14. See e.g., Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights 
(Oxford Univ. Press 1995); Will Kymlicka, Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, 
Multiculturalism and Citizenship (Oxford Univ.Press 2001).
15. Indian Citizenship Act of 1924, 43 Stat. 253. See also Frank Pommersheim, At the Crossroads: 
A New and Unfortunate Paradigm of Tribal Sovereignty, 55 S.D. L. Rev. 48 (2010).
16. Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884).
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by the guardian federal government and not by the individual Indian ward 
himself” (166). This case provides the framework within which Pommersheim 
reminds us that both colonizer and colonized, at various points, struggled to 
reconcile Indian nation citizenship with Indians’ inclusion in the larger polity.
One fascinating component of Pommersheim’s discussion of Indian 
citizenship is in the way in which he addresses notions of consent. That is, 
as members of pre-constitutional sovereign nations, many individual Indians 
conceived of themselves—and still do—as members of their tribe first, and as 
citizens of the United States secondly, if at all. Legal challenges to the U.S. 
Citizenship Act of 1924, as Pommersheim notes, have all been brought on 
the grounds that tribes did not consent to American citizenship and that the 
defining legal relationship of tribes to the federal government was established 
by and explicated through treaties (170). Thus, this discussion of citizenship 
makes clear that “[o]n one hand, citizenship may be seen as a badge of inclusion 
and respect; on the other hand, it may be seen as advancing undue assimilation 
and even colonialism. This is especially true in the Native American context, 
where very often inclusion demanded the surrender of tribal membership, that 
citizenship of the heart” (171). The issue of Indian consent to the democratic 
project that is America resonates in both the context of citizenship, and later, 
in the debate over constitutional inclusion.
Pommersheim also devotes considerable space to the issue of religious 
freedom—or lack thereof—for American Indians under the U.S. Constitution. 
Part II describes how the federal government waged an all-out war on 
indigenous religions, criminalizing ceremonies such as the Sun Dance (187) 
and Ghost Dance (188), prosecuting ceremonial uses of peyote (197), declining 
to protect the use of eagle feathers in religious practice (201), and viewing the 
Constitution itself as a barrier to protecting Indians’ access to their sacred, 
religious sites (189). Linking this up to his larger, constitutional project, 
Pommersheim writes:
As in the beginning, Native Americans are welcome to become Christians and 
have their religious rights fully protected. Yet the norm of actual and potential 
constitutional exclusion of non-Christian Native American free exercise claims 
remains pervasive and threatening in the context of sacred sites in the public 
domain, the use of peyote (and other controlled substances), the possession of 
eagle feathers for religious purposes, and incarceration. Despite some positive 
statutory and executive branch policy changes, the Constitution has failed to 
keep up (208).
Ultimately, Part II makes points that are critical to understanding the 
history and rights of Indians in America today, even if it reads as symptomatic 
of, rather than defining as to, the relationship of Indian nations to its colonizer. 
In one critical sense, however, Part II is wholly consistent and reflective of 
the remainder of the book. In pitch and tone, Part II—like Broken Landscape 
as a whole—is always forward looking. Departing from some of the cynicism 
reflected in other contemporary writings, Pommersheim continuously tries to 
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build bridges through his work, emphasizing, again, that “[m]utual respect, 
dialogue, and a commitment to problem solving are the necessary guideposts 
for a meaningful future for all” (181).
It is in Part III, The Modern Encounter, where Pommersheim really breaks 
new ground. Reminiscent of other scholars writing in the field, Pommersheim’s 
concerns over the fate of Indian nations are rooted in the judicial dissolution 
of Indian sovereignty.17 He laments that the Indian law jurisprudence in the 
Supreme Court “has become wholly a field of ‘ought,’ to be filled not by 
constitutional and statutory dictates, but rather by what the Court thinks is 
best for all concerned” (229).
Thus, he ultimately advocates for an amendment to the U.S. Constitution, 
seeking to secure the status of Indian tribes in the federal system and affirm 
tribal sovereignty. He proposes this language:
The inherent sovereignty of Indian tribes with these United States shall not 
be infringed, except by powers expressly delegated to the United States by 
the Constitution.
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the 
provisions of the Article (307).
He insists that “[c]onstitutional status is paramount to ward off the notions of 
dependency and ‘implied divestiture,’ which hold tribal sovereignty hostage 
to the whims and sufferance of a Congress and Supreme Court untethered to 
the Constitution” (308).
With intense focus on the troublesome “federal common law” of federal 
Indian law that threatens to destroy its subject, Pommersheim makes the case, 
if trepidatiously, for constitutional reform to ameliorate—or at least stymie—the 
destructive effects of judicially imposed limitations on Indian sovereignty. He 
does so with some recognition that he is, perhaps, on shaky political ground, 
acknowledging that “there has been little or no push from Indian tribes or 
national Indian organizations for such constitutional reform” (308). He 
attributes this to “the fact that the pressing issues of day-to-day governance 
effectively deny sufficient time to thoroughly consider reform beyond focus 
on the elusive government-to-government relationship” (308). Thus, while he 
unequivocally asserts that “[a] constitutional amendment is the surest footing 
to advance and uphold tribal sovereignty in this newest of eras in Indian law,” 
at the same time he proceeds cautiously, indicating that his proposals are meant 
to incite, modestly, a “discussion about a (potential) way forward” (309).
Because Broken Landscape advocates for a constitutional amendment—an 
ambitious project by any measure—it necessarily begs the question: why now? 
In a recent public address,18 Pommersheim shed some light on this question, 
17. See e.g., Williams, supra note 6; Wilkins, supra note 6.
18. Frank Pommersheim, Professor, University of South Dakota, Remarks at the 35th Annual 
Federal Bar Association/Native American Bar Association Conference, Santa Fe, New 
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expounding on concepts contained in Broken Landscape. He attributed 
motivation for his proposal, in large part, to the fact that Indian nations 
today are doing more and more, but without constitutional protection. Tribes 
enjoyed some successes in the Court in the modern era, but mostly when they 
were operating in a “defensive tribal sovereignty” mode, merely trying to stave 
off state aggression. But when tribes attempted to do more—and particularly 
where they have attempted to assert criminal or civil jurisdiction over non-
Indians within reservation borders—the tide began to turn. This move, from 
“defensive” to “offensive” tribal sovereignty, according to Pommersheim, 
has placed tribal sovereignty at a crossroads. “The ‘defensive’ sovereignty 
deployed in the past to contain state aggression in Indian country,” he wrote, 
“may be an inadequate framework to support the new ‘offensive’ sovereignty, 
which tribes seek to realize in their attempt to govern all those found within 
reservation borders” (309).
Without constitutional principles to guide the courts in general, and the 
Supreme Court in particular, in their analysis of Indian law cases, tribes remain 
extremely vulnerable to the judiciary’s whims and to what some scholars have 
labeled the “common law of colonialism.”19
But even if Pommersheim is persuasive on the question of “why now?” 
a larger, looming challenge rests in the “how.” The mere suggestion of 
amending the Constitution is radical, particularly in a country—as we are 
constantly reminded—that is increasingly polarized, largely informed by niche 
media, and less and less likely to engage others in the public forum and open 
our own ideas up to scrutiny and revision. Moreover, as Rebecca Tsosie has 
noted in responding to Pommersheim,20 his proposal constitutes a potentially 
dire theoretical conundrum for America. The United States has a “unitary 
vision” of the nation-state that manifests in an extreme distrust of “special 
rights” and “special status.” Thus, the idea of concretizing tribes’ distinct 
status in the nation’s governing documents is likely to arouse great opposition. 
Pommersheim, too, notes that much of the controversy surrounding Indian 
tribes’ rights of self-governance “loops back to an overarching question in 
modern Indian law of how much normative space is available to tribes to 
employ tradition and custom that diverges from, and even trenches on, the 
dominant canon” (241). Given the nation’s extreme discomfort over where and 
to what extent self-governing indigenous groups fit, if at all, in a multicultural, 
democratic America, Pommersheim’s proposal initially feels at best beyond 
reach.
Despite these obstacles—and Pommersheim himself recognizes there are 
many—he has taken the time to anticipate and respond to the criticism that 
there might be other–perhaps even better—ways of achieving the protections 
Mexico (Apr. 8, 2010). Responses were provided by Professor Carole Goldberg, UCLA 
School of Law, and Professor Rebecca Tsosie, Arizona State University College of Law.
19. Philip P. Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism in Federal Public Law, 119 Harv. L. 
Rev. 431, 443 (2005).
20. Tsosie, supra note 18.
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for Indian sovereignty that he seeks. I characterize three threads of potential 
opposition as: the treaty critique, which argues that Indian nations should 
seek a return to treaty-making as a basis for self-governance rather than seek 
a constitutional amendment; the international law critique, which advances 
international human rights law as providing the best structural and substantive 
protections for indigenous peoples’ self-determination; and the comparative 
law critique, which suggests that the experiences of other countries with 
constitutional amendments weigh against going down that path. All three 
criticisms are anticipated at least in some sense by Pommersheim and receive 
fair treatment in the book.
As Pommersheim notes in his telling of the government-to-government 
relationship of Indian nations to the United States, in the early period, “treaties 
were the primary form of legal interaction between the federal government 
and tribes” (63). This authority vested in Article II of the Constitution, which 
sets forth that “He [the president] shall have the Power, by and with the 
Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of 
the Senators present concur…”(63). From the inception of the republic until 
1871, as Pommersheim points out, “the United States entered into more than 
350 treaties with Indian tribes” (63). But Congress passed a law to deprive 
the president of this treaty-making power in 1871, thus ending the period of 
treaty negotiations between tribes and the United States government (64). 
Although the end of treaty-making was, at core, the result of a “squabble 
between the Senate and the House of Representatives” (64), as Philip Frickey 
has pointed out, “the symbolism of the action cut against the notion of tribes 
as sovereigns.”21
Pommersheim anticipated the possibility that a “return to treaty making” 
might be preferred “as the best way to reestablish meaningful government-
to-government relationships” (308). Yet, as he points out, the treaty making 
“approach is conceptually and practically problematic” for numerous reasons, 
including the fact that Indians are now citizens of the United States, presenting 
the “basic problem of making a treaty between the citizens of the same country.” 
Moreover, the law that ended treaty making in 1871 still stands as a “statutory 
bar” against the U.S. entering into treaties with Indian tribes (308). In sum, 
there are such enormous practical, legal, and conceptual bars to relying on a 
return to treaty-making to protect Indian nations that Pommersheim—rightly, 
it seems—concludes that such an approach could gain little or no traction.
As it has become clear that indigenous peoples have become a special subject 
of concern under international law, Pommersheim anticipates that human 
rights discourse might be viewed as the preferable avenue for solidifying the 
rights of Indian nations. With the adoption by the UN General Assembly 
of the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 2007, there is 
undoubtedly a growing movement to turn towards international human 
rights law as a defender of indigenous rights, and, concomitantly, to break 
from the limitations of domestic, colonial law that has for so long deprived 
21. Frickey, supra note 19, at 441.
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indigenous peoples of their rights of self-determination and self governance. 
Undoubtedly, Pommersheim recognizes the importance of international 
law in advancing the cause for indigenous rights. He devotes the entirety of 
Chapter 9 to the subject, questioning whether international law is capable of 
providing for “[a] new model of indigenous nation sovereignty” (259–293). To 
flesh out his analysis, Pommersheim draws extensively on the groundbreaking 
international human rights work of S. James Anaya (266, 268–9). Tracing the 
growth of indigenous peoples rights in the context of international human 
rights law, Pommersheim makes note of perhaps the most definitive change in 
recent decades: a transition from a focus on individual rights towards “a concern 
for the collective rights of indigenous people to engage in self-governance,” 
which has made space for an international human rights discourse focused on 
the rights of peoples (266).
Pommersheim freely concedes that international law’s ideals are both 
valuable and potentially quite useful for advancing the rights of Indian nations 
in the U.S. context. As he points out, many of the goals of international law 
are articulated domestically. But as Pommersheim notes, “the rub is in the 
details of federal funding, the execution of the trust relationship, and judicial 
accountability” (292), which—in his view—creates “alarming uncertainty and 
asymmetry between these norms and their meaningful implementation” (292). 
Thus, although the theories may be consistent and aligned, the uncertainty in 
practical application is “aggravated in domestic Indian law when there is no 
constitutional (or even statutory) tether from which to discern an enduring 
national commitment to the program of self-determination” (292). Moreover, 
as is well known, the U.S. is loathe to bind itself to most international human 
rights instruments. And, even if bound, “[t]here is…no way to enforce these 
norms domestically, even when an international agency or court has so ruled” 
and “[s]tate sovereignty…trumps the remedial force of such international 
bodies” (282). Thus, for Pommersheim, international law holds promise and 
certainly is a place where advocates should continue to seek progress. But at 
least for the time being, success in international tribunals still problematically 
means “secur[ing] a moral victory without practical vindication” (284).
Ultimately, Pommersheim seems to vest more hope in exploring how the 
domestic law of similarly situated nation-states is taking shape to protect 
indigenous rights. He focuses, in particular, on the settler states of Canada, 
New Zealand, and Australia, which, he contends, have domestic laws or 
structures in place that comprise “a legitimate beginning” for a more robust 
set of protections (293). Canada provides the sharpest comparative point, as 
it amended its constitution in 1982 to account for indigenous rights in ways 
substantively quite comparable to Pommersheim’s own proposal. Section 
35(1) of the Constitution Act reads: “The existing aboriginal and treaty rights 
of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby recognized and confirmed.”22 
Pommersheim recognizes these changes, of course, and discusses Canada in 
22. Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, pt. II, § 35(1) (U.K.), 
reprinted in R.S.C., No. 44 (Appendix 1985).
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Chapter 9, though without an extensive discussion of what effect, if any, that 
constitutional change has had in the lives of First Nations peoples (285–87).
But the comparison to other nations that have engaged in similar reform 
presses the question of whether such reform ultimately has the potential to 
improve indigenous nations’ rights of self-determination and protections for 
tribal sovereignty. Carole Goldberg has questioned the efficacy of seeking a 
constitutional amendment as a way for tribes to secure their political position 
within the United States. As Goldberg remarked in a public discussion of 
Broken Landscape, her work with First Nations peoples has revealed that the 
constitutional change in Canada has not, in fact, had an overwhelming impact 
on First Nation’s self-governance.23 And she is not alone. Other scholars too 
have questioned whether constitutional change will produce better results 
in the courts for indigenous groups.24 This work suggests that it might 
not be expedient for tribes to expend the political capital necessary—and 
undisputedly, it would take a great deal of political capital—to amend the 
Constitution to protect tribal sovereignty if it ultimately will have relatively 
scant effect on Indian nations.
Finally, although Broken Landscape expertly makes the case for a 
constitutional amendment, it does not fully engage the question of what the 
consequences would be for tribal sovereignty if such an amendment was enacted. 
Pommersheim states the “goal” of the project is “to provide respectful and 
durable constitutional recognition of inherent tribal sovereignty” “with a new 
sense of respect and inclusion.” He emphasizes that it “would not displace 
treaties as the cornerstone of tribal sovereignty” but would “build on that 
sturdy foundation to create a modern structure that synthesizes the best of 
the old and the new—to create, as it were, a modern architecture of sovereignty 
that is best capable of preserving the past and advancing the future” (307). 
Though this language is appealing, it is hard to imagine, practically speaking, 
exactly how it would play out on the ground.
For example, one area that remains a mystery–and that is likely to cause 
concern among tribes—is whether such an amendment would alter the existing 
relationship of tribes to the Constitution. After all, as Pommersheim points out, 
and as is well known: “[t]ribes predate the Constitution and are not subject to 
its limitations,” making Indian tribes the only governments within the United 
States not bound by the Constitution’s Bill of Rights (184).25 In fact, tribes’s 
extra-constitutional status was the basis for Congress’ decision to extend 
similar provisions as those contained in the Bill of Rights to Indian tribes via 
the 1968 Indian Civil Rights Act. Although ICRA follows the language of 
23. Goldberg, supra note 18.
24. See, e.g., Kirsten Matoy Carlson, Does Constitutional Change Matter? Canada’s Recognition 
of Aboriginal Title, 22 Ariz. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 449 (2005).
25. Angela R. Riley, (Tribal) Sovereignty and Illiberalism, 95 Cal. L. Rev. 799, 800–01 (2007).
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the Constitution’s Bill of Rights closely, it does not directly mimic it. And the 
Supreme Court’s 1978 ruling in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez26 means that, save 
habeas corpus actions, civil rights violations must be adjudicated by tribal 
courts, and are not subject to federal court review. This resulting structure 
leaves Indian tribes to govern themselves, largely beyond the constraints of the 
Bill of Rights, and, sometimes to even govern illiberally. Practically speaking, 
this allows tribes to, for example, maintain theocratic governments, establish 
matriarchal or patriarchal membership rules, and banish political dissidents, 
among many other acts.
All of this means that tribes have been permitted to govern themselves—even 
when against the core tenants of liberalism—because of their pre-constitutional 
status. Though Pommersheim’s proposal presumably relies on the full consent 
of Indian nations—with the concomitant understanding that tribes would not 
advance an amendment that did not maintain certain protections for tribal 
sovereignty—Broken Landscape does not take on directly the possibility of full 
application of the Bill of Rights to Indian tribes. Thus, one might expect that 
tribes would be extremely wary of inclusion in the Constitution if doing so 
could even potentially mean corresponding limits on tribal sovereignty that 
would thwart or destroy some core facets of tribal life and culture.
Thus, the inclusion of tribes in the Constitution presents at least one 
profound dilemma: that tribes will be fully incorporated and fully subject to 
the Bill of Rights at the expense of tribal autonomy. Though Pommersheim 
does not address this critique head on, he does not ignore this issue altogether. 
He notes that, in his work in Indian country, individual Indians often seek 
and desire the same panoply of rights and protections afforded to other U.S. 
citizens—such as due process, transparency, separation of powers, etc.—even 
when these rights are sought to be enforced as against tribal governments.27 
And as a staunch advocate of tribal self-determination, even he would argue 
that the path he has laid out would not and should not gain any ground 
without full tribal support.
Though traversing some familiar territory, Broken Landscape is a comprehensive, 
beautifully crafted, ambitious work that courageously breaks from the swarm 
of contemporary critique of the Supreme Court’s Indian law jurisprudence. 
From my vantage point, the most promising thing about Broken Landscape 
is that it is a beginning, not an end. Pommersheim has written the book as 
an invitation to dialogue, and an incitement to action. Despite the cynicism 
surrounding events of the past two decades—and they are undoubtedly worthy 
of a cynical view—Pommersheim reminds us time and again that there are 
things that tribes can do to improve upon the current situation. He promotes 
26. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
27. Pommersheim, supra note 18.
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transparency, education, and action, ultimately deferring to tribes as to 
whether change should come in the form of a constitutional amendment at all.
Always seeking a conciliatory way towards dignity and reconciliation, 
Pommersheim concludes:
[T]his is the time to seize the initiative to advance the dialogue, with the 
primary goal being to ensure tribal sovereignty a place of dignity and respect 
in any new era, whatever it might be called…. Constitutional inclusiveness is 
not only about individuals but also about sovereigns who were here first…. 
The momentum of (modern) tribal sovereignty requires a new model of 
respect, dignity, and constitutional community (257).
